A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief
Most philosophers of mind these days think that to believe something is to have a representation of some sort in one's mind.
1 A prima facie difficulty with this view is that representations seem to be discrete entities -either fully present in the mind or wholly absent -while belief is a continuous phenomenon. Not only does believing come in degrees of certainty (a widely-acknowledged fact but one that introduces substantial complications for a representational account of belief if pursued in detail 2 ), but also multifarious other cases exist in which people are neither quite accurately describable as believing a certain proposition, nor quite accurately describable as failing to believe it, for reasons that go beyond uncertainty, such as in cases of self-deception, gradual learning, forgetfulness, and when there is ignorance of related facts. If the reader has any trouble imagining such cases, a number will be described in this paper.
I think that the preceding difficulty for the representational view of belief is more than just prima facie, though I will not argue the point here. 3 What I propose to do instead is to suggest a way of thinking about belief harmonious with the fuzzy, continuous nature of the phenomenon, an account that provides the tools usefully to describe both central cases of believing and peripheral cases in which the subject stands somewhere between believing and failing to believe. In offering such an account, I take myself to be doing something like what Carnap (1950) called "explication"; I am presenting a way to think about belief that may not quite match our ordinary understanding (which is a bit confused) but comes close and, hopefully, has the compensating virtues of precision, clarity, and utility for philosophical and scientific purposes.
I call the account of belief I am about to offer a phenomenal, dispositional account.
I call it a dispositional account because it treats believing as nothing more or less than being disposed to do and experience certain kinds of things. I call it a phenomenal Eric Schwitzgebel
December 4, 2000 Account of Belief, p. 3 account because, unlike dispositional accounts as typically conceived, it gives a central role to first-person, subjective experience, or "phenomenology." I will begin with a statement of the account. I will then discuss "in-between" cases of believing in some detail. I will conclude with a discussion of the relations between the proposed account of belief and several other positions one might take regarding belief.
The Account.
To begin, we will need the concept of a dispositional stereotype. By a stereotype, I mean a cluster of properties we are apt to associate with a thing, a class of things, or a property. 4 Adapting an example from Putnam (1975) , stereotypical properties of tigers include (among other things) their being striped and their being four-legged. A white or three-legged creature may still be a tiger, but it cannot be a stereotypical one. Stereotypes may be accurate to different degrees. An accurate stereotype is one in which most of the stereotypical properties are had by most of the objects to which the stereotype applies; a less accurate stereotype is one in which the stereotypical properties are instantiated in fewer of the objects to which the stereotype applies. Some elements of a stereotype may be broadly inaccurate -for example, if one of the stereotypical properties of tigers were that they lived in African jungles.
Dispositions can be characterized by means of conditional statements of the form: If condition C holds, then object O will (or is likely to) enter (or remain in) state S. O's entering S we may call the manifestation of the disposition, C we may call condition of manifestation of the disposition, and the event of C's obtaining we may call the trigger.
Exactly what the connection is between O's having the dispositional property to enter state S in condition C and the truth of the conditional statement associated with that disposition is a matter of some debate, into the complexities of which I will not enter here as the account does not depend on one particular way or other of resolving the matter. 5 with each disposition in its stereotype. Think of the dispositional stereotype for the belief that P, rather, as consisting of the cluster of dispositions that we are apt to associate with the belief that P. Dispositional personality traits may similarly not be amenable to full explicit specification: How exactly is a smart person disposed to think and act? We can start a list of stereotypical dispositions, but as in the belief case, it seems impossible to finish it without circularity. Furthermore, due to the generativity of language, the number of possible beliefs, and so the number of belief stereotypes, is indefinitely large. Even if no one has ever considered the possibility of believing that Ed's bowling ball is stuffed with custard, commonsense psychology equips us amply enough that we are still apt to associate certain dispositions with that belief. Therefore, I would like to distance the technical concept of 'stereotype' employed here from any elements of the ordinary notion of a stereotype that preclude the possibility of stereotypes that have never been used.
A further complication arises from the fact that not every person will be apt to associate exactly the same dispositional properties with any given belief -no more than everyone would agree about the stereotypical properties of a chair. For this reason, it is important to talk about a "cluster" of stereotypical properties: Some properties will be central and widely agreed upon, others will be marginal. Because a preponderance of the most central properties in the stereotype for a chair can be widely agreed upon, we can agree to a substantial extent about what are and are not typical chairs. A similar general but imperfect concord is available in the case of belief. For simplicity's sake, then, I will generally speak as though there were one stereotype for every belief, though strictly speaking this is not true. The dispositional properties belonging to belief stereotypes fall into three main categories. The most obvious, perhaps, are behavioral dispositions, the manifestations of which are verbal and nonverbal behavior, such as, in the present case, the disposition to say that there is beer in the fridge (in appropriate circumstances) and the disposition to go to the fridge (if one wants a beer On my view, a person who possesses all the dispositions in the stereotype for (for example) believing that "There is beer in my fridge" can always accurately be described as believing that there is beer in her fridge. A person who possesses none of the relevant dispositions can never accurately be so described. And, of course, between these two extremes is a wide range of cases in which the subject has some but not all the dispositions in the stereotype. Roughly speaking, the greater the proportion of stereotypical dispositions a person possesses, and the more central those dispositions are to the stereotype, the more appropriate it is to describe her as possessing the belief in
question. An additional element of vagueness is introduced if one accepts that having a disposition is not itself always a simple yes-or-no matter.
No one disposition is either necessary or sufficient for the possession of any belief.
It may occur to some that the disposition to feel assent to an internal utterance of P (or to think silently to oneself, "P") comes close to being a sufficient condition for believing that P; nevertheless, we must allow that people sometimes feel assent to utterances the contents of which it is not wholly accurate to describe them as believing, for example,
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To believe that P, on the view I am proposing, is nothing more than to match to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects the dispositional stereotype for believing that P. What respects and degrees of match are to account as "appropriate" will vary contextually and so must be left as a matter of judgment. This vagueness and contextdependency does not undermine the value of belief ascription, but rather makes it flexible and responsive to our needs as belief ascribers. Similar vagueness and contextdependency can be found in the ascription of character traits, providing them with a similar flexible utility. The numerous examples in this paper will, I hope, help to support the view that talk about belief can be vague and flexible in this way and still quite useful -more useful in fact than an approach that rigidly insists on determinate yes-or-no answers to all questions about what people believe. I will describe a number of inbetween cases of believing in section four, but first I will discuss an issue pertinent to handling cases of deviation from the stereotypes and compare the account with earlier dispositional accounts of mental states.
Ceteris Paribus Clauses and Excusing Conditions.
A substantial complication for this account, crucial to the assessment of adherence to the stereotypes, arises from the fact that the stereotypical dispositions to which I appeal hold only ceteris paribus or "all else being equal." Joe might believe there is beer in his fridge, but if he is particularly stingy with his beer, he may not be ready to offer beer to a thirsty guest or even to admit he possesses beer at all. We wouldn't want to say that Joe's reluctance to divulge the presence of beer in his fridge makes it any less accurate to describe him as believing it to be there. The question then arises, however, whether in putting forward such a principle we have added anything of substance to the account. Scientific and everyday generalizations are shown false by deviations that undermine our reasons for thinking the generalizations to be widely, approximately, or at least in "ideal" circumstances, right; we introduce ceteris paribus excuses in just those cases where we feel that a deviation from the generalization does not affect its overall applicability. Introducing a rule, then, that says ceteris paribus excuses are to be admitted exactly when a deviation does not threaten the basic accuracy of the generalization is simply to state what is implicit in the admission of ceteris paribus defeasibility from the beginning.
Clarifying this point helps us to see two factors that come together in assessing deviations as potentially excused. The first factor is an empirical assessment of the
Eric Schwitzgebel
December 4, 2000 Account of Belief, p. 12 likelihood of the generalization's broadly falling apart given that the deviation has taken place -in other words, how broad or narrow is the range of circumstances in which we can expect the generalization not to hold? The second is an assessment of the importance of deviation in the circumstances in which deviation can be expected. Can one afford a certain amount of looseness in the generalization because the cases are marginal or covered by other generalizations, or will one want to insist on a stricter regularity? No set of explicit rules seems to be able to guide us as well in making such assessments as does a well-practiced, intuitive grasp of the topic in question. This lack of explicitly specifiable rules for separating excused from unexcused deviations from a generalization suffuses even the most robust scientific theories (see, e.g., Cartwright 1983 ).
Philosophers of science have learned to resist the temptation to try spelling out in full detail the ceteris paribus conditions for substantive, specific, scientific generalizations.
In the case of belief, then, the manifestation of stereotypical dispositions depends on the satisfaction of both a range of explicit conditions and a range of tacit, ceteris paribus conditions that may not be fully specifiable. When a subject does not, or would not, manifest a stereotypical disposition despite the satisfaction of all explicit conditions of manifestation, we may say that the subject deviates from the stereotype. A deviation is excused just in case an implicit condition of manifestation is not met or the manifestation is prevented by some circumstance consistent with the possession of the disposition -in other words, if the ceteris paribus clause is sprung. Although there can be no firm rule to distinguish excused from unexcused deviations, we have an intuitive sense that allows us to sort deviations along a spectrum from the clearly excused (such as deviations due to physical incapacity) to the clearly unexcused, with vague cases in the middle.
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If a deviation from a stereotype for a belief is excused, it counts not at all against the accuracy of describing the person as having that belief. If it is not fully excused, the question of whether it will count as an important deviation -one that makes us hesitate to ascribe the belief or makes the belief ascription less apt than it could be -will generally This context-dependence is an important feature of the proposed account. Different dispositional properties will, in different contexts, be more or less crucial to decisions about whether to ascribe a particular belief or not, and in intermediate cases failure to attend to the context of ascription can result in differing assessments of the appropriateness of a belief ascription. Such inattention to context may be partly responsible for the wavering and disagreement about how best to describe the kinds of inbetween cases of believing that philosophers sometimes find puzzling.
Differences from Traditional Dispositional Accounts and a Thought on Ryle.
Dispositional accounts of mental states are not, of course, new. Ryle (1949) helped begin a trend toward regarding much of mental life as fundamentally dispositional or dispositionally specifiable -or, not so differently, as functionally specifiable. 11 (One might think of a dispositionally specifiable state as a state of an object, e.g., a brain, apt to
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December 4, 2000 Account of Belief, p. 14 bring about specified effects under specified conditions, and of a functionally specifiable state as a state of an object apt to bring about specified effects under specified conditions and to be produced by specified causes.) Others (e.g., Marcus 1990 , Searle 1992 , Audi 1994 ) have endorsed dispositional accounts of belief, or specifically of unconscious or non-"occurrent" belief, independent of a broader dispositionalist or functionalist program.
Few of these accounts, however, appeal to phenomenal dispositions in their characterizations of belief, except secondarily and apologetically, with the promise that the phenomenal states themselves ultimately yield to functional or dispositional analysis.
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One reason for this difference is that previous dispositional accounts of belief have tended to serve a rather different purpose than the present account is meant to serve. Many of the anti-behaviorist objections to dispositional accounts of mental states are inapplicable as a consequence of the central role given to phenomenal dispositions in my account. The most compelling of these objections exploit the loose connection between mental states and behavior. Putnam (1963) , for example, imagines a society of "super-spartans" who feel pain but do not exhibit the range of behaviors typically associated with pain (except perhaps avoidance, which is not specific to pain). Similarly, Strawson (1994) imagines a species of "weather watchers" who have beliefs and desires about the weather but are constitutionally incapable of acting in any way on the basis of those beliefs and desires. Chisholm (1957) emphasizes that we should not describe someone as disposed to act in a certain way, given a particular belief, unless we grant that that person has other particular beliefs and desires. For example, though Geronimo may believe that his aunt will be arriving at the railroad terminal in twenty-five minutes, it is only true to say he is disposed to go there to pick her up if he wants to pick her up and if his beliefs about how to get to the railroad terminal are not too deeply confused. Full conditions for the possession of any particular belief or desire can never be given in terms of behavioral dispositions alone; appeal to some other aspect of the subject's mental life will always be necessary. or to replace all talk of belief with some other kind of talk. Since phenomenal dispositionalism does not aim to bring about these ends, it is no objection to phenomenal dispositionalism that it is impossible to do so.
I would like to conclude this section with some remarks about Ryle, the intellectual forefather of dispositionalism about mental states. Although he is typically viewed as a behaviorist for whom appeal to phenomenal dispositions would be strictly out of court (and he is, of course, committed to attacking the ghost-in-the-machine picture in a way that I am not), his case is more ambiguous than it first appears. Ryle certainly stresses the importance of behavioral dispositions and downplays the importance of phenomenal ones, sometimes even seeming to suggest that we could do without the latter entirely.
Nevertheless, Ryle admits the relevance of such things as "silent colloquies" that others could not possibly overhear and tunes in one's head consisting of "the ghosts of notes similar in all but loudness to the heard notes of the real tune" (1949, pp. 184, 269 ).
Noting such remarks, Hampshire (1950) , in one of the earliest and most careful critiques of Ryle, regards him as having an "ambiguity of purpose" regarding the reduction of assertions about mental life entirely to statements about behavior. Despite his reputation,
Ryle at times seems committed to the importance of internal, first-person phenomenology.
In light of this possibility, Ryle's short discussion of belief is interesting:
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Certainly to believe that the ice is dangerously thin is to be unhesitant in telling oneself and others that it is thin, in acquiescing in other people's assertions to that effect, in objecting to statements to the contrary, in drawing consequences from the original proposition, and so forth. But it is also to be prone to skate warily, to shudder, to dwell in imagination on possible disasters and to warn other skaters. It is a propensity not only to make certain theoretical moves but also to make certain executive and imaginative moves as well as to have certain feelings (1949, pp. 134-135 ).
If we set aside for a moment the standard picture of Ryle as bent on reducing all talk about mental life to talk about behavioral dispositions, this passage begins to look rather like an appeal to a mix of behavioral, phenomenal, and cognitive dispositions. Perhaps a bit optimistically, then, I would like to claim Ryle as the first (albeit wavering) advocate of phenomenal dispositionalism about belief.
Mixed Sets of Dispositions.
The dispositional account of belief deals quite naturally with in-between cases of believing of the sort alluded to at the beginning of this paper, cases in which it seems not quite appropriate to describe the subject as either fully believing or not believing the proposition in question. In this section, I provide a few examples of such mixed cases and sketch some of the patterns into which they tend to fall. Ellen, a twenty-year-old, studied Spanish for four years in high school. On the basis of her studies and her exposure to such Spanish words as 'mesa,' 'niña,' 'oreja,' and 'vaca,' she is willing, sincerely and cheerfully, to assent to the claim that all Spanish nouns ending in 'a' are feminine. Ellen has, however, occasionally come across certain are considering which side she might take in a debate on the subject, it seems acceptable to say that she does believe that all Spanish nouns ending in 'a' are feminine. On the other hand, if we are interested in her skill as a speaker of Spanish and the likelihood of her making embarrassing gender errors in speech, it seems inappropriate to ascribe that belief to her. If we want to describe her doxastic state on the topic as carefully as possible, the best thing to do is to refuse to put the proposition 'all Spanish nouns ending in 'a' are feminine' either simply in or simply out of some imaginary "belief box" in her head, and instead to sketch the mix of her dispositions as I have just done.
Geraldine's teenage son Adam smokes marijuana. Usually Geraldine is unwilling to admit this to herself, and sometimes she adamantly denies it. Eating lunch with a friend, Geraldine can deplore her friend's parenting because of his daughter's drug use while denying in all sincerity that Adam has any similar problems. Yet she feels afraid and suspicious when Adam slouches home late at night with bloodshot eyes, and when she accuses him of smoking pot, she sees through his denials. In a certain kind of mood, she would tell her therapist that she thinks Adam smokes marijuana, but in another kind of mood she would genuinely recant such a confession. When Geraldine's husband voices concern about Adam's behavior, Geraldine sincerely comes to her son's defense.
What does Geraldine believe on the subject? Someone insisting on a simple "Yes she Geraldine are between believing and failing to believe the relevant propositions.
Although some cases of in-between believing become manageable simply upon recognition of degrees of belief, cases such as those described above do not yield to this approach. It is not that Ellen and Geraldine simply have a low degree of confidence (say .6 on a scale from 0 to 1) in the truth of the proposition in question. Rather, they are disposed to feel in some situations quite confident in asserting one thing, while at the same time they are disposed to feel in other situations quite confident in asserting the opposite. Their doxastic condition is far from the kind of simple uncertainty that one might feel, for example, about the outcome of an election or the toss of a die. The cases that are the focus of this paper are no more manageable by an analog view of belief, on
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The dispositional account of belief recommends handling cases such as these by describing how the subject's dispositions conform to the stereotype for the belief in question and how they deviate from it. Subsequent questions may then be raised about the reasons for the match and mismatch of particular dispositions to the stereotype, opening avenues for both scientific research and everyday inquiry. Unlike at least some representational approaches to belief, the dispositional account of belief does not leave it as an open question whether, once their dispositional structure is fully characterized, Ellen or Geraldine really have the belief or not. There is no internal chalkboard on which the belief might be written in the language of thought, no warehouse in which it might be stored, despite its inconsistent "manifestations." Once all the relevant dispositions have been made clear, the case is closed. There are no further facts to report.
Normativity and Patterns of Deviation.
The usefulness of classifying people's mental states by appeal to stereotypical dispositional patterns depends on the tendency of people to adhere to these patterns. If cases such as Ellen's and Geraldine's were the norm, the dispositional stereotypes of belief would have little purpose. As a general rule, people who conform to some parts of the stereotype are apt to conform to other parts also. Furthermore, deviation from the stereotypes often falls into particular recognizable patterns, a few of which I will briefly sketch below.
The stereotypes capture more than merely statistical regularities, however. They capture something about how we think people ought to think, feel, and behave.
Something about Ellen's and Geraldine's dispositional profiles strikes us as normatively lacking, as incoherent or confused. We feel that if Ellen and Geraldine correctly reasoned things through, they wouldn't deviate from the dispositional stereotypes in the way they This is not to say that conformity to all elements of the stereotypes is required by reason. For example, we can hardly convict someone of poor reasoning simply for not feeling disappointment upon suddenly learning that P, on which he had greatly counted, is false -strange though it may be in some cases and contrary to the stereotype. At the same time, however, something about such cases leaves us uneasy. Our folk psychology and everyday dealings with other people are so thoroughly dependent on the accuracy of these stereotypes that there is a kind of social accountability to the stereotypes that pervades even those aspects not shored up by the norms of reason. This, I think, is especially evident in the stereotypes associated with desires and personality traits, which are less thoroughly accountable to the strict demands of reason, and which consequently allow more room for social accountability to come undisguised into play. A person who is disposed greatly to enjoy ice cream on some occasions but to detest it on others, with no clear excusing conditions (such as detesting it only in times of grief or when she's already overfull with sweets), evokes this sort of discomfort. We want to know whether, "really," she likes ice cream or not, just as we want to know whether "really" Geraldine believes her son smokes marijuana. There will not always be in such cases a definite resolution of the kind we find satisfying. Still, we push for it: We want to fit people into our stereotypes, and there is social pressure on them actually to do so. In trivial cases, we tend not to be too deeply bothered, and the pressure is light. As the desires become more significant, or as deviation spreads across a larger variety of situations, the social reaction becomes more negative -and since such cases typically involve beliefs or moral values as well as desires, it can become unclear, even indeterminate, from which of a web of stereotypes it is most appropriate to describe the person as deviating.
14 Nevertheless, certain patterns of deviation are pervasive enough that they don't at all strike us as strange, and in such cases we are much less likely to bring normative Similarly, people are often disposed to recognize and agree with assertions that P and to answer correctly a question like "P? Yes or no?" and yet not be able to come up with P as an answer to a more open-ended question or to act upon the truth of P when uncued.
My dispositions regarding the last names of many of my acquaintances from college follow this pattern.
As a general rule, the more closely a mixed dispositional set matches a familiar pattern of deviation, the less puzzling it appears to us. At the other end of the spectrum are cases in which the subject's dispositions regarding P vary widely in no recognizable pattern at all. In the extreme, we would have to describe such cases as insanity.
A careful description of such in-between cases will tell exactly in what respects the subject deviates from the stereotype of the belief in question and in what respects the subject accords with that stereotype; it will look for a recognizable pattern in these deviations; and it will indicate which dispositions should count, in the present context, as the most important ones to the assessment. The description may or may not have a normative element of the sort described in this subsection.
A Short List of Patterns of Deviation.
It may be helpful to conclude this section by describing at least a few common patterns of deviation. The list below is by no means exhaustive. Some of the patterns of deviation on this list will suggest more irrationality on the part of the subject than others, in rough proportion to the extent to which the subject could, by simple reflection, bring herself in line with the stereotype.
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Modularized believing: It is common for a subject's dispositional profile to match a belief stereotype in a narrow domain of practical expertise, but to deviate from the stereotype in most other domains and particularly with respect to the disposition to assent to the relevant propositions in speech. A driver's knowledge of how to steer into her driveway is an instance of this pattern. Cognitive psychologists sometimes describe such cases as cases of procedural (as opposed to declarative) knowledge.
Unconscious beliefs:
Case studies in clinical psychology suggest that a subject may match a stereotype for believing that P in being disposed to claim that P under hypnosis or in free-association or in other of the techniques of psychotherapy; and the subject may exhibit hysterical or destructive symptoms that seem somehow consonant with a belief that P, though distorted; yet that subject may not be willing under normal circumstances to assent to P, even privately, because there is something unpleasant to the subject about the thought that P. This idea has been generalized into the popular notion of the unconscious, according to which a person may be disposed to act in a variety of ways in accordance with the stereotype for believing (or desiring) that P, yet because of the unacceptability of the thought that P, not be disposed to admit to himself that P is the case. Different people may assess differently the frequency of such cases, though it seems hard to deny that they at least sometimes occur.
Low confidence: People are not always perfectly confident in the truth or falsity of a proposition. Scholars interested in Bayesian decision theory have tended to characterize a subject's degree of confidence by associating a number from 0, indicating complete certainty in the falsity of the proposition in question, to 1, indicating complete certainty in its truth. If a person has modest confidence that P is true -a level of confidence that a Bayesian might characterize by saying that her degree of belief is .75 -it may be appropriate in some contexts to say, without qualification, that she believes that P, while in other contexts that simple ascription may be inappropriate or misleading. We may then qualify the belief ascription by saying that she suspects P to be the case or is inclined to
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December 4, 2000 Account of Belief, p. 24 think that P, or by using Bayesian language. As a person's confidence declines, her match to the belief stereotype will also decline: She will be more likely to hesitate in asserting P, or may assert it only with qualification, or may refuse to assert it if the penalty for making a false statement is significant; she will feel less surprise if P turns out to be false; she will be less likely, unless she is interested in hypotheticals, to pursue the consequences of P very far in her reasoning; instead of offering that beer to the guest, Joe might say "let me check to see if we have any beer"; and so forth.
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Self-deception: Cases classified by folk psychology in the category of "selfdeception" may be a subset of cases of unconscious believing. Geraldine's attitude toward her teenage son may fit, imperfectly, into this category of deviation. Philosophers have disputed at length about whether to describe the self-deceived subject as really believing the unpleasant proposition she would prefer to deny, or as really believing its opposite, or as somehow believing both. Few have endorsed, as I would, the view that the subject is not really accurately describable as believing either.
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Unreflective inconsistency: A subject may deviate from a stereotype simply because she fails to put two and two together. Ellen's case fits into this pattern. She matches the stereotype for believing that all Spanish nouns ending in 'a' are feminine in just those cases in which she is not reminded of a few exceptional nouns, and she deviates in cases in which those nouns become salient to her. We might suppose that with sufficient reflection, Ellen would come to match fairly exactly the stereotype for believing that not all Spanish nouns ending in 'a' are feminine. In cases of this sort, one would expect a match to the stereotype for believing a proposition in just those cases in which the reasons against believing that proposition are not salient. Pierre does not know that 'London' and 'Londres' refer to the same city, he fails to conform completely to the stereotype for believing that London is ugly (e.g., he will deny the claim when it is made in French), although he does possess some dispositions central to the stereotype (e.g., the disposition to assert it sincerely in English). Everyday intuition seems to be fairly competent at determining what the dispositional effects of any particular type of peripheral ignorance might be.
Developing beliefs:
This type of deviation is closely related to the previous two.
Acquiring a network of knowledge in a particular domain and forging that knowledge into the kind of coherent structure necessary consistently to match the stereotype for various beliefs in that domain requires a certain amount of time. During this period of transition, the subject will have a mixed dispositional profile with respect to the relevant beliefs. According to Vygotsky (1978) , for example, children typically acquire major new abilities and understandings by passing through a period during which they can exercise the knowledge or ability only with prompting or with proper structuring of the environment. As the child develops, less and less of this external "scaffolding" is necessary for the child to meet with success, and the child passes to fully developed competency.
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Partial forgetting: The processes of forgetting and unlearning, in some ways the opposite of belief development, also do not typically take place all at once. I am in the midst, for example, of forgetting the telephone number from my last apartment in Berkeley. Shortly after I left Berkeley, I could have rattled it off easily; later, it would have required more effort and sometimes would not have come; now I can recall the number only with a prompt of some sort; perhaps later I will be able to pick it out in a forced-choice test; in ten years, I may have no knowledge of it whatsoever. The more demanding the recall situation and the fewer the prompts provided, the less likely Talking about beliefs is useful because people with some of the dispositions in a stereotype will tend to have many of the other dispositions in that stereotype. Because of this, we can make generalizations and inductions on the basis of these stereotypes, and it is enormously convenient, even indispensable, to appeal to beliefs in describing our mental lives. Still, when there is a breakdown in the match between stereotype and the actual dispositional set of a subject, as will often happen in cases of the sort described above, simple belief talk may no longer be appropriate, and appeals to the stereotype may have to be replaced with more complicated appeals to specific dispositions or sets of dispositions or to recognizable patterns of deviation. On the account being offered in this paper, once the dispositional profile of the subject is made clear, it is a mistake to think that there is still some further question to be answered, namely, what does the subject really believe?
A Concern about Phenomenal Dispositionalism about Belief.
Functionalists such as Putnam (1966) and Lewis (1972 Lewis ( , 1980 , as well as some externalists about belief content such as Putnam (1975) , Burge (1979) , and Davidson
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December 4, 2000 Account of Belief, p. 27 (1987) argue that the "content" of a belief is individuated not only in a forward-looking way, that is, by the phenomenology, behavior, and non-phenomenal mental states it is apt to produce, but also at least in part in a backward-looking way, by how it came about (or at least how states of its type are apt to come about). In other words, both groups of philosophers highlight the importance of looking back at the causes of beliefs in determining their content. In this section, I will address the concern that the dispositionalist account I propound will run against the arguments invoked in favor of the backward-looking elements in these positions. Externalists about belief hold that whether a subject believes that P, or whether the subject believes, instead, that Q, depends, at least sometimes, on facts about the world external to the subject herself. The dispositional account offered here is compatible with our intuitions in the kinds of cases typically invoked to support externalism. In fact, the present account comports more exactly with our intuitions in such cases than do standard externalist views. Given that our intuitions on the Twin Earth case and other externalist cases described by philosophers such as Davidson (1987) and Burge (1979) are somewhat ambivalent and context dependent, as I think they are, the dispositional account of belief I have offered has an advantage over standard externalist accounts, since it provides room for such ambivalence and even allows us to predict contexts in which the intuitions may go one direction or the other. In the water-treatment case, the dispositions Wayne and Dwayne do share are the focus of concern, and so the dispositionalist account would predict an inclination to regard the two people as having the same belief. In other cases, where externally individuated dispositions are emphasized, the dispositional account will predict externalist intuitions. Although it is common for functionalists considering the individuation of mental states to argue for the importance of causal role generally, they typically run quickly over the question of whether in the functional analysis of belief one must include the backward-looking elements of causal role as opposed to only the forward-looking elements. Armstrong (1980) and Shoemaker (1981) The account is no more complex, and quite possibly a fair bit simpler, than functionalist approaches, which must appeal to the same sorts of ceteris paribus generalizations as the present account does, and internal representation approaches, which, if interpreted realistically, posit covert entities related in a complex way with anything directly observable (at least to a third party -and plausibly, I think, even in one's own case). The account may also avoid some of the difficulties that beset other accounts, though no doubt it brings difficulties of its own that I do not have the foresight to guess. I have argued that the account is especially useful, while other approaches are at best vague, in handling "inbetween" cases of believing of the sort that should interest anyone concerned with the messy details of development, forgetting, irrationality, ignorance, context-dependence, or other such issues.
The metaphysically inclined may wish to ask whether, useful or not, the present account accurately describes what belief really is. I must admit that I fail to feel the impulse that drives questions such as this -and corresponding questions in other areas of philosophy, such as, What is a person, a cause, or free will, really? There are useful and less useful ways to think about such topics, ways that correspond better with divisions and tendencies of the sort reported by empirical sciences, ways that promote or hinder a particular vision of human flourishing and the development of moral community. A philosophical account or concept may prove useful in one context or relative to one set of goals and a hindrance in another context or with other goals. As far as I can see, there is no more sense in the insistence that one account or another is the real, honest, metaphysical truth about things than there is in insisting that an ace is really, honestly, metaphysically the highest card, independently of the game that is being played.
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Representational approaches to belief have played an important role in cognitive science, and this account is not meant to displace them, but to supplement or complement them. In some contexts, I believe, the present account will prove more useful; in others, a representational approach will work as well or better. The likelihood that the accounts will in some cases give contradictory answers to questions about belief implies that one cannot think of both accounts as literally true and universally applicable. But this need be no hindrance to endorsing them conditionally or as idealizations -and we endorse (or should endorse) most scientific theories no differently (see Cartwright 1983 and Dupré 1993 .
Someday, an advanced neuroscience may replace our talk of belief (as envisioned in Fodor (e.g., 1990 ), Dretske (1988 ), Millikan (1984 , Cummins (1996) , and Searle (1983) .
2 Although he does not cast his concerns as concerns for the metaphysics of representations, some of these complications appear as concerns about clutter avoidance and conditionalization in Harman (1986) . For example, the well-known difficulty of how to account on a representational theory for the apparently infinite number of beliefs each of us has (e.g., I believe that the number of planets is less than 10, also that it is less than 11, etc.) becomes even more intractable if propositions about which one has no settled opinion are beliefs of low or intermediate degree of confidence. It may then follow that for every possible proposition, one must have a representation of some sort in mind.
Also, philosophers such as those described in the previous note have struggled to describe naturalistically how a belief gets its content and the role it plays in action. This task is apt to become much more complicated by the introduction of degrees of belief: If (simplifying a bit) the belief that a cow is there is just the belief apt to be caused, in normal circumstances, by a cow's being there, what are we to say about the belief, with .4 degree of confidence, that a cow is there?
3 Schwitzgebel (2001) develops this point in a little more detail and explores some novel cases of in-between believing. However, most of the ideas appearing in that short paper are developed in much greater depth in the present work.
4 Putnam (1975) offers a similar view of stereotypes. I differ from Putnam in associating stereotypes with things, classes, and properties instead of words and in seeing stereotypes as clusters of properties rather than sets of ideas.
5 For a review of the literature on dispositions, see Prior (1985) . A spread of views can also be found in Tuomela (1978) and Armstrong, Martin, and Place (1996) .
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6 Since I will be characterizing belief in terms of stereotypical dispositional properties, variations of this sort, especially in extreme cases, may lead to a degree of relativism about the accuracy of belief ascriptions: It may turn out that for you, with your stereotypes, it is accurate to describe me as having a particular belief, while for someone else, with her stereotypes, it is not accurate to describe me that way. Although I suspect that differences in stereotype will tend not to be large enough to produce substantial differences in the appropriateness of belief ascriptions, relativism of this sort is not in any case as odious as it may at first appear. On the view espoused in this paper, dispositional facts are fundamental in matters of belief, and the language of belief is employed as a convenient way of grouping together dispositional properties that tend to co-occur. Since the accuracy of attributions of dispositional properties to a particular person does not vary from ascriber to ascriber (caveat: see note 9), the relativism about belief that may be engendered by my account is ontologically superficial -it is a consequence only of variations in people's shorthand ascriptions and does not reflect real differences in the subjects themselves.
7 It may be that some of the some of the stereotypical dispositions that I have presented as behavioral are really tacitly hybrid dispositions of this sort. How exactly to work this out would depend on one's view of tacit conditions of manifestation (see section 2 and note 9) and whether, for example, the disposition deliberately to walk to the fridge is equivalent to the disposition to walk to the fridge, given certain tacit conditions of manifestation.
8 Cases for the usefulness and non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws and generalizations are made by Cartwright (1983) and Pietroski and Rey (1995) . The river example is from Fodor (1987) , who uses it for similar purposes. 10 When considering a disposition for the purposes of assessment of adherence to a belief stereotype, the evaluation of excuses may be different than when considering, for other purposes, a disposition with the same manifestation and explicit conditions.
Physical incapacity to utter the required phonemes will not necessarily be a ceteris paribus excuser from the disposition to utter "there is a beer in my fridge" if we are
